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ABSTRACT Behavioural interventions that directly influence decision-making are increas-
ingly popular policy tools. Two prominent interventions used are nudges, which promote an
optimal choice without restricting options, and boosts, which promote individual capabilities
to make more informed choices. Direct comparison is a critical step toward understanding
the populations and contexts where they may be most efficient, or potentially complementary
toward improving their effectiveness. Two trials in the US and Serbia (N= 1423) tested a
series of choices under uncertainty using both nudge and boost interventions. In a replication
setting, hypothetical and consequential decisions are used. Findings indicate that disclosure
nudges and boosts, unlike social nudges, promote more advantageous financial decisions.
Furthermore, the effects of disclosure nudges and boosts generally differ depending on loss
and gain framing—boosts promoted more advantageous decisions under gain frames while
disclosure nudges did so under loss frames. Finally, boosts were typically more effective for
those who initially made suboptimal choices and sociodemographic factors did not mediate
the effectiveness of the interventions. These insights provide clarity to highly nuanced,
complex patterns across population behaviours in the context of financial choice under
uncertainty and considerable implications for the design of interventions for policies that
impact population behaviours.
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Introduction
Insights from the behavioural sciences are increasingly appliedto policy settings (Slatev et al. 2017). Two popular tools inboth research and practice are nudges, interventions aimed at
influencing behaviour without limiting or forcing options (Sun-
stein 2014), and boosts, interventions aimed at fostering compe-
tencies that improve capacity for choice (Grüne-Yanoff and
Hertwig 2016; Hertwig 2017). Although commonly discussed in
the same scientific and policy context, few studies have directly
compared nudges and boosetts (Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff
2017).
Direct comparisons of these tools would offer critical insight
into the contexts and populations in which one intervention may
offer superior features, or where each may serve as useful com-
plements to the other. As has been argued for explicitly in recent
literature (Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff 2017), this is of particular
importance in policy contexts that are increasingly characterised
by substantial economic and social inequalities, which can result
in greater risk taking (Payne et al. 2017) and greater costs to
vulnerable populations.
In this study, we compare the effects of two nudges (a dis-
closure and a descriptive social norm), a boost (explicit training
to better understand choices), and a control condition. Each
intervention is considered potentially useful for encouraging
advantageous financial decisions under risk (Pedroni et al. 2017),
a domain with well-studied patterns for suboptimal choice (Cox
et al. 2015). Specifically, we explored a decision context in which
participants choose between one of two options (one risky and
one certain), with one being more advantageous than the other.
To date, no research has produced insights in these methods with
directly comparing the nudges and boosts.
Recent research suggests that individuals quickly learn to
choose advantageously in environments that promote certain
behaviours with better payoffs (Erev and Roth 2014). We con-
sider decisions as advantageous if they have a higher expected
value (EV; the total value multiplied by the probability of
occurrence) than the alternatives (Kagel and Roth 2016). Deci-
sions were considered suboptimal if individuals choose the pro-
spect with a lower EV.1 A prospect is an option comprising
specific monetary value and probability of occurrence (Von
Neumann et al. 2007).
Disclosures are nudges that present decision-relevant infor-
mation in an explicit way, ensuring an individual is aware of
critical, salient details prior to a choice. ‘Information’ in this
context refers to the calculated EVs of prospects (Sunstein 2014),
which are rooted in two empirically driven theoretical
assumptions:
(1) Reducing uncertainty with decision-relevant information
increases advantageous choice (Bell 1982, 1985, Lempert
2002);
(2) Disclosure nudges can create an emphasis framing, making
relevant information more salient (Chong and Druckman
2007).
The second nudge, a descriptive social norm, informed parti-
cipants of the most popular choice, which was the prospect with
the highest EV. This application of descriptive social norms is
rooted in two assumptions:
(1) Individual decisions will seek to align with normative group
behaviours (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Sherman et al.
2014)
(2) A social norm will have greater influence if the norm is
made more salient (Cialdini et al. 1991).
Boosts aim to promote individual understanding of statistical
information to enhance decision-making capabilities (Berkowits
et al. 2015; Hogarth and Soyer 2015; Lusardi et al. 2017; Dhami
et al. 2018). Boosting is rooted in the assumption that some
heuristics are used unconsciously, while others are explicitly
learned and deliberately applied (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002;
Johnson et al. 2013). If this is accurate, individuals should be able
to exert effortful thinking to recognise and override heuristic
judgements, to the extent to which they are aware that a choice
resulting from heuristics is incorrect. Kahneman concludes that
people are mostly unaware of cognitive errors and are therefore
unable to override them (Kahneman 2003). On that assumption,
using boosts is a riskier approach to increase advantageous choice
because, regardless of individual judgement ability, flawed heur-
istics may still result in suboptimal decisions.
In the studies we present here, the boost taught participants a
specific skill and a decision rule. Specifically, participants were
taught how to calculate the EV of a prospect and were then told
to choose the prospect with the highest EV. In doing so, applying
the rule should be most likely to increase overall payoff. This
boost derived from studies that use ‘rule-of-thumb’ training to
promote advantageous choice, finding that such training showed
larger effects on financial choice than formal accounting training
(Drexler et al. 2014).
Prospect Theory postulates that for losses, a certain (guaran-
teed) loss has a lower subjective magnitude than an uncertain
(unguaranteed) loss, which explains increased frequency of risky
choices (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). For gains, a certain
outcome has a higher subjective magnitude than an uncertain
one; thus, increasing the frequency of certain choices. Individuals
are therefore more likely to be risk-averse for gains and risk-
seeking for losses (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 1991). This is
evident in the framing effect: the idea that the presentation of a
prospect will influence how it is judged. This forms the funda-
mentals of prevailing theory that individuals may be inconsistent
in choosing two logically equivalent prospects if framed differ-
ently (Kahneman and Tversky 1984).
The Reflection Effect posits that a single, common parameter
governs risk-seeking such that individuals who are more risk-
averse for gains are also less risk-averse for losses (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979). A recent paper challenges this, concluding that
there is no significant correlation between risk preferences (i.e.,
the tendency to take or to avoid risk) for gains and losses on an
individual level (Kurnianingsih and Mullette-Gillman 2015).
Specifically, although the Reflection Effect holds on the popula-
tion level, it is not strictly consistent within individuals. Thus, the
effectiveness of an intervention may vary substantially depending
on the option they seek to promote and on the prospect’s frame.
This approach is further meaningful as individual differences
in risk preference are also critical to consider, particularly if there
is a population-level application involved (Ruggeri et al. 2017).
Such applications are commonly the case in behavioural inter-
ventions within policy settings. Sunstein argued that strong
behavioural preferences moderate the effectiveness of interven-
tions (Sunstein 2017). Indeed, even if an intervention is theore-
tically sound, targets a relevant construct, and is implemented
correctly, individual, contextual and population-specific media-
tors can make them ineffective, or even irrelevant (Chaiyachati
et al. 2018).
Certain risk preferences correlate with specific socio-
demographic backgrounds. Findings indicate that risk aversion
increases with age (Hallahan et al. 2004) and falls with greater
education attainment (Grable 2000) and higher income (Hartog
et al. 2002). Other studies have found that women are more likely
to be risk-averse than men (Eckel and Grossman 2002), married
people more risk-averse than singles (Hallahan et al. 2004), and
people who have never moved to another country more risk-
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averse than immigrants (Halek and Eisenhauer 2001). Finally,
unemployed individuals (Halek and Eisenhauer 2001) and self-
employed workers (Masclet et al. 2009) are less likely to be risk-
averse than salaried workers, and public-sector employees are
more likely to be risk-averse than private-sector employees
(Hartog et al. 2002).
Using an online assessment of participants making a series of
binary decisions, we were able to:
(1) Infer the effects (on choice) of disclosure nudges, boosts,
and descriptive social norms to identify intervention
effectiveness in promoting advantageous choice;
(2) explore how prospect framing influenced intervention
effectiveness;
(3) investigate whether sociodemographic factors moderate
intervention effectiveness;
(4) determine if findings are consistent between a US and a
Serbian sample;
(5) compare patterns between hypothetical choices and con-
sequential items using real money.
Method
Design. To control for potential confounding effects of individual
differences on choice, we used matched controls to allocate par-
ticipants to four different groups—control, disclosure, descriptive
social norm, and the boost group. Before being exposed to an
intervention, participants made a binary decision involving a
risky and certain prospect with equal EVs. The item asked,
‘Which of the following would you prefer: A 50% chance to win
$2000 or a 50% chance to win nothing, or A 100% chance to win
$1000’; 0.5 × 2000= 1000 is equal to 1000, so no option was more
advantageous. This allowed for an equal allocation of participants
that choose the risky option to all groups. Participants also made
two additional binary decisions where one prospect was more
advantageous than the other. The three decisions established
participant ‘baseline decisions’, which were later compared with
their postintervention decisions.
Participants in the control groups were not subject to an
intervention. Participants in the disclosure group received
information on prospect EVs, which served as an explicit
indication of the most advantageous prospect. In the social norm
group, participants were exposed to a descriptive social norm
which told them which prospect was selected most by other
participants. Participants in this condition were informed that the
prospect with the highest EV was the most popular choice. The
design of nudges should steer decisions towards advantageous
prospects (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Participants in the boost
group learned the concept of EV, how EVs are calculated, and
why choosing prospects with higher EVs overall leads to more
advantageous decisions. The intervention ended with a test where
participants had to calculate the EVs of three prospects.
Participants in this group were encouraged to use calculators.
Boost design ensures that participants can calculate EVs to make
advantageous choices as they were not allowed to continue the
survey until they answered the three practice items correctly.
Once allocated, participants made decisions on eight discrete,
binary items. Each item consisted of one certain prospect (100%
chance of occurring) and one risky prospect (uncertain chance of
occurring). Each prospect differed in monetary value, framing,
and risk. This designed allowed us to explore when risky choices
are more likely to occur, and how interventions affect this. A pilot
study was conducted for experimental item selection (see
Supplementary Information (SI)).
Four items had certain prospects worth $200 and were
considered low magnitude. The other four had certain prospects
worth $1000 and were considered high magnitude. In each
magnitude bracket, the difference in EV between the two
prospects remained constant, regardless of whether they were
framed as losses or gains. Thus, risky prospects of the same
magnitude always yield the same EV. See the SI for a table
showing the prospects of all the experimental items.
Items presented risky prospects as either high-risk (25% chance
of occurring) or low-risk (75% chance of occurring). Depending
on whether the risky prospect had a lower or higher EV than its
respective certain prospect, items were either low-advantage or
high-advantage, respectively. Choosing risky prospects was
suboptimal for low-advantage items and advantageous for high-
advantage items. To illustrate: one of the items asked, ‘Which one
of the following do you prefer: A 25% chance to win $910 or a
75% chance to win nothing or A 100% chance to win $200’;
0.25 × 910= 227.50 is greater than 200, so the risky option is the
advantageous option.
Prospects in low-advantage items were framed as losses, while
prospects in high-advantage items were framed as gains. This
controlled for the effects of framing on decisions (Tversky and
Kahneman 1992). Specifically, risky prospects in low-advantage
items are less likely to be chosen because they are less
advantageous. In gain frames, they are even less likely to be
chosen because risky choice occurs less in this context (Tversky
and Kahneman 1991). The use of loss frames for low-advantage
items avoided the counter-effects of gain frames steering
participants away from risk. Such a design is not necessary for
high-advantage items, because participants are more likely to
choose the risky prospect as it is more advantageous than the
certain prospects. Altogether, this paradigm allowed for the
exploration of choice, when certain choices either did or did not
increase EV, in contexts with different monetary values, expressed
either as gains or losses.
To test changes in advantageous choice, we summed the
number of advantageous choices each participant made for the
four items with a gain frame, and four items with a loss frame.
We will refer to these sums as Advantageous Choice Scores (ACS),
ranging from 0 to 4. If these two scores were positively correlated
we would have combined them into a single score ranging from 0
to 8, where 8 would mean consistently choosing the advantageous
option. However, as they did not correlate strongly, we analysed
risky decisions for losses and gains independently.
Decision items were randomised to avoid order effects. To
avoid any stereotype threats, the nine sociodemographic items
were asked last (Nardi 2018). All variables are associated with
specific risk preferences and likely to influence choice for some
participants. Our aim was to assess general patterns of choice
under risk along with certain interventions, and then to see of
these patterns replicate in a different country and language. As we
do not focus on cross-national comparisons, we present
replication findings after the original trial, rather than con-
temporaneously. Details on replication methods are in SI, as they
are generally identical to the main study methods.
Experimental procedures. The study was administered through
Qualtrics. US participants were told that their decisions would
not result in real monetary outcomes. Responding to all items was
mandatory, although participants had the right to leave the study
at any point. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Participants first responded to three decision items. They were
then split into one of the four groups. Unless they were in the
control group, they were exposed to an intervention. They then
responded to eight decision-making items. Finally, participants
were asked about calculator use, and answered nine
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sociodemographic questions. The survey used this order because
the sociodemographic questions could prime answers to the
decision items, an effect known as social priming (Molden 2014).
Study data will be publicly available on GitHub.
Participants. A power analysis was run to determine the smallest
sample size suitable to detect the effects of an ANOVA. The alpha
level set to 0.05 and a power set to 0.8. The estimation indicated
that the minimum number of participants had to be 123, with a
final sample of 1009 achieved. The larger than necessary sample
size was recruited to run more complex analyses for which power
analysis was harder to conduct.
For the initial study, participants had to be from the US and
above the age of 18. The study expressed monetary values in US
dollars. The 1124 participants were recruited via Amazon
Mechanical Turk.
Measures
Decision-making items. The eight items are described in the
previous section.
Baseline risk-taking. Three items were used to measure partici-
pant preintervention baseline decisions on risk. They are descri-
bed earlier and are available in the SI.
Sociodemographic variables. We measured: age, gender, country
of residence, highest level of completed education, relationship
status, parental status, employment status, work sector (public or
private), immigration status, and annual household income.
Other. Participants were asked whether they used a calculator.
Replication. For the replication study, the items were translated
from English to Serbian by one of the members of our research
team, who is a Serbian–English bilingual. The translation was
proofread, edited, and back-translated by four individuals that
speak both English and Serbian. Decision-making items used
euros rather than dollars, as people in Serbia are more familiar
with this currency and often use it in private transactions. Income
bands were modified to fit recently published deciles in Serbia for
the demographic items. The replication survey used two addi-
tional consequential items expressed in Serbian dinars that
resulted in real-life financial outcomes for the participants. One
item was framed as a loss while the other framed as a gain.
Consequential item values in dinars were identical in number to
euros, though the real value is ~1 euro to 100 dinars. Participants
were recruited through Ipsos, a market survey company with an
office in Serbia.
Statistical modelling. All Bayesian models reported for the US
sample were conducted using the brms package (v. 1.9; Bürkner
2017) which is an R-wrapper (v. 3.4.3) for STAN (v. 2.16). All
models used improper flat priors across all parameters. Each
model used 589 as a seed and sampled four chains with 4000
iterations in each, discarding the first 1000 samples for burn in,
resulting in 12,000 posterior samples for each model. All model
parameters converged with Rhat values of 1, down to 3° of
precision.
All Bayesian models reported for the Serbian sample were
conducted using the brms package (v. 2.7) (56) which is an R-
wrapper (v. 3.5.2) for STAN (v. 2.18.1). All models used improper
flat priors across all parameters. Each model used 671 as a seed
and sampled four chains with 4000 iterations in each, discarding
the first 1000 samples for burn in, resulting in 12,000 posterior
samples for each model. All model parameters converged with
Rhat values of 1, down to 3° of precision.
The lasso regressions were fit using glmnet (v. 2.0–13)
(Friedman et al. 2010). The data were split into five folds using
the groupKFold function in the caret package (v. 6.0–87), using
589 as a seed. The AUROC to compute the GINI coefficients for
the logistic model comparisons were computed using pROC (v.
1.10; Robin et al. 2011).
Bootstrapped confidence intervals for Spearman correlations
were computed by drawing 100,000 new samples with replace-
ment, computing the correlation coefficients for each of these
simulated samples and checking the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of
the resulting distribution of correlation coefficients. The resam-
pling and correlations were conducted in pandas (v. 0.24.1).
Results
US sample. In total, 1124 participants completed the survey. To
increase the probability that data for analyses included only
participants that paid attention during the survey, participants
whose total survey duration was faster than 110 s (meaning that
they had taken <5 s per question, on average) were excluded (105
participants). We also excluded participants who had total survey
durations >3 standard deviations of the mean in log(seconds)
(1279 s; ten participants). The final sample was 1009 participants.
After exclusions, all groups were approximately balanced, with
257 people in the control condition, 254 in the social norm
condition, 263 in the disclosure condition, and 235 in the boost
condition. The final sample was gender balanced between females
(n= 494; 49%) and males. Participant ages ranged from 19 to 89
(m= 38.1, sd= 12.6), 60% had a college degree or higher, 17%
had junior college, and 23% had high school or less).
Decision patterns and relationship between decisions for gains
and losses. We first tested whether advantageous decisions for
gains and losses correlated. We found that ACS in the gain frame
only had a weak relationship with ACS in the loss frame
(Spearman’s ρ=−0.12, bootstrapped 95% CI=−0.05 to −0.18,
p= 0.0002; see Fig. 1), in line with recent research on risk pre-
ferences (Kurnianingsih and Mullette-Gillman 2015; Tymula
et al. 2013). Consequently, we separated the ACS for gains and
losses, giving two separate outcome measures ranging from 0 to 4;
ACSgains and ACSlosses.
For the gain frame, the risky option consistently had a higher
EV than the certain option. Consequently, ACSgains both capture
how many times the advantageous option was chosen, and how
many times the risky option was chosen. Conversely, for the loss
frame the certain option always had the highest EV, so ACSlosses
capture both the number of advantageous choices and the
number of certain choices. Therefore, ACSgains can also be
interpreted as a measure of risk-seeking, and ACSlosses can be
interpreted as a measure of risk aversion. We find that ACSgains
and ACSlosses are distinct computational quantities when we
compare the experimental scores with the baseline questions.
To further test the effect of frame on choices we ran two
Bayesian linear regressions predicting ACSgains from baseline
performance. The first model only used the congruent baseline
item to predict ACS, the second model used the sum of all three
items. We used approximate leave-one-out cross-validation (loo
CV) to compute the Expected Log pointwise Predictive Density
(ELPD) for a new dataset to compare the fit of the two models.
ELPD is a measure of predictive error similar to AIC, BIC, or
DIC. However, ELPD is robust in several contexts where the
other measures perform poorly, such as when the number of
parameters is high relative to the number of observations, or
when the parameters are hierarchically structured (Vehtari et al.
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2017). When comparing two models using ELPD, one computes
the difference between the two models, and the standard error of
the comparison, estimating uncertainty. In the results presented
later, we show the difference between the more complex model
and the simpler model such that positive numbers signify an
advantage for the complex model, with the standard error of the
comparison shown in parentheses. The model with only the
congruent baseline item explained ACSgains slightly better than
the model containing all three items (ELPD=−25.2 (21.7)). We
ran a similar test for ACSlosses with the same result (ELPD=
−14.1 (21.6)). Note that both of these differences are within or
near the standard error of the estimate, so we cannot conclude
that the congruent item does better than the combined baseline
measure. What we can conclude is that the two models are nearly
equivalent, implying no information is added by the non-
congruent items. Our sample could be described as generally risk-
averse: of the total 11,099 financial choices participants made,
71% favoured the certain prospect.
Choice at baseline and postintervention decision-making. To
investigate how baseline choices and the interventions influenced
choice in the gain and loss frames, we ran a set of Bayesian linear
models. We ran four nested models each for the gain and loss
frame, predicting the ACS:
1. Intercept-only: null model,
2. Model adding a predictor for baseline advantageous choice:
baseline model:
3. Model adding a predictor for the interventions:
intervention model
4. Model adding an interaction term between the baseline
advantageous choice and the interventions:
interaction model.
The final model allowed us to test whether baseline choice
moderated the strength of the interventions. For example, it
would test whether the boost had a greater effect for participants
who made suboptimal choices at baseline.
Accounting for baseline choices improved model fit compared
with the null model for gains (ELPD= 155.1(29.4)) and for losses
(ELPD= 196.4(26.9)). In addition, accounting for the interven-
tions improved predictive power even when baseline choices were
accounted for (ELPDgains= 40.4(15.2), ELPDlosses= 16.4(9.2),
and adding the interaction term further improved model
performance (ELPDgains= 12.7(10.9), ELPDlosses= 7.8(7.3)), sug-
gesting that the interventions had different effects based on
baseline performance. Though the most complex models were the
best at fitting the data, it is important to note that the
improvement of the interaction models relative to the main
effect models is within 95% CI based on the standard errors. To
get a sense of which interventions lead to the most advantageous
financial choices in the gain and loss frames, and how they
interacted with baseline performance, we analysed the posterior
probabilities of the coefficients in the most complex models (See
Fig. 2).
By comparing the posterior samples of the coefficients for
various groups, we could directly compare how different
interventions influenced the experimental choices as a function
of the baseline choices (See Fig. 3). We found that choices at
baseline positively predicted experimental choices, such that
participants who picked the item with the highest EV at baseline
had higher ACS, on average, across conditions. In addition,
participants who picked the option with lower EV at baseline
tended to benefit most from the interventions.
For the gain frame, among those who picked the high EV
option at baseline, the only reliable difference between the groups
was that the boost group had lower ACS than the control group.
However, for those who were making suboptimal choices at
baseline, the disclosure nudge was reliably associated with higher
ACS compared with the social nudge and the control group.
Meanwhile, the boost was associated with a reliable increase in
advantageous choices compared with all other groups.
For the loss frame, for the participants who picked the more
advantageous option at baseline, the boost was reliably associated
with lower ACS than the two nudges. For the participants who
chose the suboptimal option at baseline, the social nudge and the
boost were reliably associated with higher ACS than the control
group, while the disclosure nudge was associated with reliably
higher ACS than all other groups. There were no other differences
Fig. 1 Advantageous choices do not correlate strongly between the gain and loss frame, and participants were generally risk-averse. Advantageous
decision-making in the gain frame was not strongly associated with advantageous decision-making in the loss frame within participants, as ACS scores
were only weakly correlated between the gain frame and the loss frame (a). Observations have been made semi-transparent and jittered to enhance
readability. Participants typically favoured suboptimal choices for gains (b), and advantageous choices for losses (c), meaning that most participants were
typically risk-averse (d)
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Fig. 2 Baseline choices strongly moderates the effectiveness of the interventions. The overall strongest intervention in the gain frame was the boost (a) and
the strongest intervention in the loss frame was the disclosure nudge (b). Disaggregating the participants by baseline performance suggests that
participants who made more advantageous decisions at baseline also made more advantageous decisions post interventions across all groups. This was
true for both the gain frame and for the loss frame. Participants who made suboptimal choices at baseline benefitted most from the interventions (c–f). a–d
show model-free analyses in that they show the disaggregated means and the error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. e, f show the
posterior estimates of the means for the various groups computed from the most complex Bayesian regression model
Fig. 3 Direct comparison of interventions with and between gains and losses. The interventions were more effective for participants who chose the
suboptimal option at baseline. Different interventions performed best for the gain frame items and the loss frame items. The graphs show the probability
that the column intervention is associated with a higher ACS than the row intervention, for the gain frame (a, c) and the loss frame (b, d) and separating
those who were choosing advantageously at baseline (a, b) and those who were not (c, d). For example, the ‘0.17’ in the upper left corner of the a means
that there is a 17% probability that the social norm is associated higher ACS than the control group in the gain frame, for participants who picked more
advantageous options at baseline. Note that ‘1’ should not be interpreted as indicating certainty that one group is greater than the other. It indicates that for
our 12,000 posterior samples, the column posterior was consistently greater than the row posterior, so given the model assumptions, it is very probable
that the column intervention is associated with higher ACS than the row intervention
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between the groups. Because the Bayesian model framework does
not make assumptions about long-running frequencies, we did
not correct for multiple comparisons, as would be proper in a
frequentist analysis (Berry and Hochberg 1999).
Altogether, the intervention effects were greater for those who
chose the suboptimal option at baseline and there were few
reliable between-group differences for those participants who
picked more advantageous options at baseline. The boosts were
associated with the most advantageous choices for the gain frame,
while the disclosure nudge was associated with the most
advantageous choices for the loss frame.
Relationship between sociodemographic variables and risk
preferences. Next, we attempted to replicate the relationship
between sociodemographic variables and risk preferences through
a machine learning approach. We evaluated 13 demographic
variables, see Table 1.
Because of the large number of predictors, we used lasso
regressions to isolate the variables with the strongest relationship
with the outcome of interest. Lasso regression has a cost function
that combines traditional maximum-likelihood methods with a
shrinkage function that pushes small coefficients toward zero.
The extent of shrinkage is determined by the tuning parameter λ.
Here, λ was calibrated by loo CV and the out-of-sample
performance of the best fitting model was determined by fivefold
cross-validation.
To test the association between sociodemographic variables
and risk preferences, we used logistic regression models to predict
baseline choices for the full sample. We evaluated the out-of-
sample model performance with GINI coefficients. GINI
coefficients are a signal-theoretic measure that captures how well
a model can discriminate between two options, where chance
performance gives a coefficient of 0 and perfect discrimination
gives a coefficient of 1, it is directly linked to AUROC so that
GINI= 2 × AUROC− 1 (Fawcett 2006). For the loss frame, GINI
coefficients ranged between −0.07 and 0.06 (M=−0.01), in line
with chance performance. In other words, none of the socio-
demographic variables reliably predicted baseline risk-taking in
the loss frame. For the gain frame, GINI coefficients ranged
between 0.05 and 0.2 (M= 0.12), which is small, but consistently
better than chance. However, none of the variables had
coefficients that were consistently different from 0 for all five
folds, so none of the sociodemographic variables reliably
predicted risk preference in the gain frame across the entire
sample. See SI for the lasso regression coefficient plots.
The analyses suggested that none of the sociodemographic
variables was reliably associated with risk preferences at baseline.
It is possible that our analyses were underpowered through using
binary outcomes to capture risk preferences. To account for this,
we tested whether the sociodemographic variables predicted risk
preferences as measured in the experimental trials for the control
group; unlike the other groups, control group choices can be
considered a pure measure of risk preference as we did not
actively manipulate their choices. Again, we calibrated λ by loo
CV, and we estimated out-of-sample performance by fivefold
cross-validation, comparing the mean residuals of the calibrated
lasso models with an intercept-only model. The calibrated lasso
models did not outperform the null model for the gain frame, nor
for the loss frame (see Fig. 4), suggesting that none of the
sociodemographic variables reliably predicted risk preferences for
the control group.
Effects of sociodemographic variables on intervention effec-
tiveness. We also wanted to test whether the sociodemographic
variables moderated the interventions’ effectiveness. We repeated
the procedure used on the control group for each of the inter-
vention groups. None of the lasso regressions reliably out-
performed the null models concerning out-of-sample residual
deviance, suggesting that the sociodemographic variables were
not associated with baseline risk-taking, nor did they moderate
any of the experimental effects.
For completeness, we explored the coefficient plots to see
whether any of the coefficients in the lasso regressions were
consistently different from 0. For the control group, we found no
such variables, reinforcing that none of the sociodemographic
variables is associated with risk-taking. However, for the social
nudge, we found that single participants made more advanta-
geous choices than participants who were in a relationship in the
gain frame. To explore the strength of this effect, we ran a linear
regression where we predicted ACS in the gain frame as a
function of relationship status exclusively for the participants in
the social norm group. The effect of relationship was significant
(β=−0.14 (0.05), t(252)=−2.6, p= 0.01), but the model
explained <3% of the variance in ACS so the effect is very small
in the context of moderation. Similarly, for the disclosure nudge,
students had slightly higher ACS than non-students in the loss
frame (β= 0.61(0.29), t(261)= 2.1, p= 0.03) but this model
Table 1 Sociodemographic variables included in the lasso regressions
Sociodemographic variable Levels Quadratic term
included
Gender Male, female No
Age [Age in years] No
Migration status Immigrant, native No
Education High school or less, junior college, university, graduate degree, doctoral degree Yes
Relationship status Single, in a relationship, engaged, married No
Sector Public, private No
Annual household income (US) Less than $10,000, $10,000-$19,999, $20,000-$29,999, $30,000-$39,999, $40,000-
$59,999, $60,000-$99,999, $100,000-$149,999, $150,000 or higher
Yes
Monthly household income (Serbia) Less than RSD 5000, RSD 5001–10,000, RSD 10,001–15,000, RSD 15,001–20,000, RSD
20,001–25,000, RSD 25,001–30,000, RSD 30,001–35,000, RSD 35,001–40,000, RSD
40,001–50,000, RSD 50,001–80,000, RSD 80,000 or higher
Yes
Parent Yes, no No
Student Yes, no No
Employed Yes, no No
Unemployed Yes, no No
Self-employed Yes, no No
Retired Yes, no No
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explained <2% of the variance in the outcome. For the boost,
students showed higher ACS than non-students (β= 0.63(0.25),
t(232)= 2.50, p= 0.01) and men had higher ACS than women (β=
−0.37(0.18), t(232)= 2.08, p= 0.04) in the loss frame. However,
the model including both effects accounted for <5% of the
variance of the outcome.
In sum, we found no evidence that any sociodemographic
variable predicted baseline risk preference. In addition, though we
found some potential moderators of intervention effectiveness in
the loss frame, the lasso regressions containing these moderators
failed to consistently outperform the null models in terms of out-
of-sample prediction error. This suggests that these are likely too
weak to be practically meaningful and should be tested again in
future iterations, as there is a high possibility they would fail to
replicate.
In addition, the lack of strong sociodemographic moderators
indicates the general choice patterns observed may be reliably
stable across groups. This would be particularly helpful in the
context of applications to policy, which often require considerable
nuance for broad effectiveness across groups or precision
targeting. As this also applied to variability in outcomes between
control, disclosure, descriptive social norms, and boosts, it
strengthens their value as insights in the context of choice under
uncertainty.
Replication with a Serbian sample. To provide further evidence
for our main results, we conducted preregistered replication2 in a
Serbian sample (N= 414). Details on the replication sample
characteristics and the preregistration can be found in the SI; the
methodology was identical to the prior study. We again found a
weak negative correlation for ACS between gains and losses
(Spearman’s ρ=−0.16, bootstrapped 95% CI=−0.06 to −0.26,
p= 0.0009), in line with our original results (Spearman’s
Fig. 4 Sociodemographic variables did not predict risk preferences or moderate experimental interventions. We used fivefold cross-validation to evaluate
the out-of-sample performance of predicting ACS scores for lasso regressions containing all the sociodemographic variables. None of the lasso models
consistently outperform the null model, suggesting that there are not any strong sociodemographic predictors of baseline risk-taking, nor any strong
sociodemographic moderators of the intervention effects. Error bars show 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals
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ρ=−0.12). Because the unsigned value of the correlation was
lower than the criterion we had set up for combining the scores in
the preregistration (0.30), we again treated the loss-frame items
and gain-frame items as separate outcome measures. The Serbian
sample was generally risk-averse, to a similar extent as the
American sample: of a total 5382 financial choice observations,
participants chose the certain prospect 69% of the time.
Our selection criteria for baseline items are in the SI. Using the
same approach as in the American sample, a model predicting
ACSgains performed as well as a model predicting ACSgains from
all the baseline items (ELPD=−17.5 (13.1)). As such, it appears
that only the congruent baseline item predicts ACSgains, in line
with our original results. Similarly, for ACSlosses, there was no
reliable difference between a model including the congruent item,
and a model containing the sum of all three baseline items
(ELPD= 2.2 (13.7)).
We predicted ACS based on baseline performance and the
interventions by running the same four nested Bayesian linear
models as we did for the US sample, again comparing model fit
with ELPD. Based on the US sample, we anticipated the baseline
model would perform better than the null model, the interven-
tion model would perform better than baseline, and the
interaction model would perform better than intervention. This
would have meant identical replication. For gains, we found that
the baseline model outperformed the null model, and the
intervention model outperformed the baseline model, but the
interaction model did not outperform the intervention model,
see Table 2. In other words, the ACSgains was predicted by
congruent baseline choices and the assigned condition, but there
was no interaction between baseline performance and the effect
of condition in the Serbian sample.
We repeated the same modelling steps for ACSlosses. Here, the
baseline model outperformed the null model, but no other model
outperformed the baseline model, see Table 3. For the Interven-
tion model, the credible intervals of all interventions crossed 0,
but the disclosure intervention had the strongest effect, in line
with our prior study. All interventions had the majority of their
probability mass in the expected direction (improving ACS),
though the credible intervals were too wide to rule out a null
effect, or even a small negative effect.
Consequential items. To further elucidate the validity of our
approach, we added two additional and consequential items in
the replication sample. Participants were told that their choices
were legitimate, and they would enter a genuine payoff based on
their preference. As the main study items use values not feasible
for such conditions, euros were simply switched to Serbian dinars
(i.e., €230 to RSD230), which is roughly 1% of the original value.
For gains, 31% chose the advantageous item (control 28%, social
norm 25%, disclosure 24%, and boost 46%). For losses, 77% chose
the advantageous item (control 76%, social norm 73%, disclosure
81%, and boost 77%).
In line with our preregistered analysis plan, we computed the
precision and sensitivity of the hypothetical items to predict the
consequential items for the same structure. For the gain item,
sensitivity was 0.65, and precision was 0.63. For the loss item,
sensitivity was 0.71, and precision was 0.60. Because these values
were below our prespecified threshold of 0.80 to treat the
hypothetical and consequential items as interchangeable, we
repeated the same modelling steps outlined in the previous
sections, with the distinction that this time we presented the
single consequential gain frame item in a logistic model. As for
ACSgains, the baseline model outperformed the null model, and
the intervention model outperformed the baseline model. In this
case, uncertainty in the models obscures whether the advantage of
intervention is robust (see Table 4). However, the intervention
models for ACSgains and for the consequential gain item are
qualitatively similar, see Fig. 5.
The symmetry in results between the consequential and
hypothetical items is further emphasised by examining the
pattern of overlap between the coefficients in the intervention
models (see Fig. 6).
We repeated the same modelling steps for the consequential
loss frame item. No model reliably beat the null model, see Table 5.
This null finding may reflect a lack of power, as we only evaluated
a single item and most people in this sample was risk-averse, so
they selected the best option independent of the intervention.
For completeness, we include the model-free figures for the loss
frame items (Fig. 7).
Discussion
The utility of behavioural science in policy is increasingly
recognised and this trend shows little sign of slowing. As beha-
vioural applications continue to develop, a nuanced under-
standing of the most effective methods in the most appropriate
contexts for the most relevant groups is critical (Slatev et al.
2017). This is not a matter of determining whether one method—
such as nudges or boosts—is better than the other, but instead,
when, where, how, and for whom is one more likely to be effective
than another, or even, when they might be optimal applied
together. We identify such insights in assessing decision-making
patterns between three intervention conditions and a control.
Table 2 Model comparisons for the gain frame
Model 1 Model 2 ELPD difference (SE)
Null Baseline 65.59 (19.34)
Baseline Intervention 32.55 (14.15)
Intervention Interaction −4.88 (3.85)
Table 3 Model comparisons for the loss frame
Model 1 Model 2 ELPD difference (SE)
Null Baseline 51.57 (13.49)
Baseline Intervention −2.65 (3.58)
Intervention Interaction 1.34 (5.23)
Table 4 Model comparisons for the consequential gain
frame item
Model 1 Model 2 ELPD difference (SE)
Null Baseline 25.01 (10.67)
Baseline Intervention 7.71 (7.84)
Intervention Interaction −4.90 (2.90)
Table 5 Model comparisons for the consequential loss
frame item
Model 1 Model 2 ELPD difference (SE)
Null Baseline 1.61 (3.91)
Baseline Intervention −3.97 (2.97)
Intervention Interaction −4.43 (3.34)
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Fig. 5 The boost intervention improves performance for hypothetical and consequential choices in the gain frame. a, bMeans of ACSgains and proportion of
advantageous choices, respectively, based on condition and baseline performance. Error bars show 95% bootstrapped CI. c, d Posterior probabilities for
ACSgains and P(Advantageous Choice) based on the intervention models (Model 3) for ACSgains and consequential choices for gains, respectively
Fig. 6 The boost intervention is robustly superior to all other conditions for hypothetical and consequential choices in the gain frame. Figure 6 shows the
probability that the column intervention is associated with a higher ACS than the row intervention (a), or with a higher probability of making an
advantageous choice for the consequential item (b). For example, the ‘0.19’ in the upper left corner of a means that there is a 19% probability that the
social norm is associated with higher ACS than the control group in the gain frame. Note that ‘1’ should not be interpreted as indicating certainty that one
intervention is superior. It indicates that for our 12,000 posterior samples, the column posterior was consistently greater than the row posterior, so given
the model assumptions, it is very probable that the column intervention is associated with more advantageous choices than the row intervention
Fig. 7 None of the interventions reliably improves performance for hypothetical and consequential choices in the loss frame. a, b Means of ACSgains and
proportion of advantageous choices, respectively, based on condition and baseline performance. Error bars show 95% bootstrapped CI
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For participants that made relatively suboptimal choices at
baseline, the boost condition showed the largest effects, most
notably in the gain frame. This finding provides impetus to
explore the potential value of boosts specifically as a tool for
reducing inequalities. Such disparities are often exacerbated in the
context of uncertainty (Payne et al. 2017), particularly for indi-
viduals who make an unsuccessful, high-risk choice early, which
is typically associated with choosing subsequent high-risk options
(Vermeer et al. 2014). This may position boosts as a com-
plementary tool in policies to mitigate high-risk behaviours in
disadvantaged populations, which are known to increase
inequalities (Payne et al. 2017).
In line with Thaler and Sunstein’s libertarian paternalism, such
an approach could be seen as libertarian educationalism: the same
high-risk options may be on offer, but individuals could be rea-
sonably informed about them in advance (Thaler and Sunstein
2008). We note that our findings do not imply that such high-risk
choices should be removed entirely, or even regress to a level in
line with those who made more advantageous choices at baseline.
However, even small effects at reducing inequalities are beneficial
to disadvantaged individuals as well as the communities to which
they belong (Payne et al. 2017).
There was an inverse pattern for ACS in the group that was
advantageous at baseline, with scores decreasing from control
through all conditions in the gain items. This pattern, based on
baseline advantageous choice, is more indicative than any
sociodemographic variable in our studies. This may indicate that
additional information may serve as a distraction for those who
otherwise might have made an advantageous choice (Jensen et al.
2017). It is worth noting that scores were lowest and variability
largest in the boost condition, which has implications for further
exploration in future research.
One argument for the effectiveness of disclosure nudges and
boosts comes from Sunstein (2016), who suggests that these
interventions educate, therefore promoting deliberative, slow
thinking. Kahneman argues that such thinking is less likely to be
influenced by heuristics and is, thus, less error-prone (and results
in more advantageous choice) (Kahneman 2011). The boosts in
our study promoted deliberative capacities in having to calculate
the EVs of three prospects. Disclosure nudges prompted parti-
cipants to think deliberatively by making the trade-off of each
prospect clearer. To give an example: information that a risky
prospect has a higher EV than a certain prospect allows partici-
pants to evaluate whether they would prefer to take such a risk.
This libertarian educationalist approach educates and informs,
thus allowing individuals to make their own decisions, rather
than guiding them towards specific decisions.
Decision-making for gains and losses can be observed as two
different behavioural domains within which an intervention may
be more or less effective; in this context, boosts were more
effective for gains, while disclosure nudges were more effective for
losses. There was no evident reflection effect, which suggests that
some of the mechanisms underlying choices for gains and losses
may be independent (Kurnianingsih and Mullette-Gillman 2015;
Tymula et al. 2013). Future research should continue to compare
intervention effectiveness for these two behavioural domains.
Such research could be of great practical use, given that it is
currently not clear why the boost was more effective for gains
than for losses; the same holds for disclosure nudges.
It is possible that the descriptive social norm in this study uses
social information for a group that is not meaningful (Sherman
et al. 2014). Participants received information on the average
decisions of participants doing an online survey, who are the
people that they do not know, cannot identify and cannot be
identified by; thus, such a description may not exert substantial
social influence. An alternative explanation could posit that the
intervention was ineffective because the social norm was not
salient compared with the presented financial information (Cial-
dini et al. 1991). In line with prevailing theories on influence, the
financial information was more decision relevant and thus more
influential (Sunstein 2016; Cialdini 2007). An effective use of
descriptive social norms should present norms that are mean-
ingful, both in the specific context and to the population to which
they are applied and are at least as salient as the other information
presented to the decision makers (Jachimowicz et al. 2018).
None of the sociodemographic variables reliably predicted risk
preferences in our sample (including gender, age, income, and
education status, see Table 1 for the full list), which stands con-
trary to existing arguments (Hallahan et al. 2004; Grable 2000;
Masclet 2009). One possible explanation for the disparity between
prior findings and ours is that prior methods used self-report
measures of risk preferences (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 2002),
whereas our study used direct behavioural measures of risk pre-
ference. This suggests that there may be a difference between how
much risk people take and how much risk they think they will
take. Recent findings support this counterargument by high-
lighting a lack of cross-methods consistency for measuring risk
preferences (Pedroni et al. 2017). This lack of awareness suggests
that certain individuals with extreme risk preferences (i.e., always
avoid or take risks) might not be aware of their potentially
damaging financial decisions, as both taking and avoiding risk
can be beneficial (and vice-versa: both can also be harmful).
Identifying such individuals through direct behavioural observa-
tions should be a policy imperative, seemingly at the same level or
even as more critical than broad sociodemographic indicators.
By replicating in Serbia, we confirm our hypothesis that pat-
terns of risk hold generally consistent across populations, as do
the intervention effects. While some effects are milder or less
differentiated between intervention and baseline groups, these
appear to be explained primarily by a smaller sample than US.
Furthermore, as the boost appears to be significant across con-
ditions, it signals that intervention effectiveness may vary between
populations and warrant further trials in additional settings.
Most exciting in the Serbian sample is the general replication of
patterns for consequential choices. Naturally, it was not feasible to
use the same values in both the hypothetical and consequential
question sets. There was therefore some concern values might
either be too small to elicit any need for risk aversion or too large
to reasonably reflect prior scenarios for comparison. In the end,
converting from euros to Serbian dinars, effectively adjusting to
1% of the original net values, did not appear to have any major
influence on general choice preferences. This indicates that classic
patterns of risk aversion hold consistent between hypothetical
and consequential behaviours, and that lowering the real values
has no broad impact, at least in a controlled setting.
Conclusions
Decision-making under uncertainty is of critical importance to
behavioural and policy research, particularly as the integration
between psychological and economic sciences continues
(Camerer 1999). While nudges and boosts are just two sets of
tools in the toolkit, they offer important insights for research and
policy practice (Cohen et al. 2016). To capitalise on that potential,
it is critical to consider the most appropriate contexts, popula-
tions, and methods for implementing interventions, rather than
presuming one is universally superior to the other (Slatev et al.
2017). This is particularly true in everyday financial choices,
where the framing of options may have a major influence over the
decision. It is also critical in contexts where decisions could
reduce or exacerbate harmful economic inequalities due to
unnecessary risk taking (Payne et al. 2017).
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The current research advances our understanding of nudges
and boosts in decisions under uncertainty along two points. First,
we find that boosts were typically more effective for those who
initially made suboptimal choices. Policymakers should therefore
consider likely risk-taking behaviours of populations being con-
sidered, as effects may be less meaningful for certain contexts and
choices. Second, the effect of nudges and boosts differ depending
on loss and gain framing, such that behaviours where a payoff is
being considered are likely to yield different outcomes than when
expenses are to be incurred. Choosing appropriate behavioural
interventions should therefore be preceded by ensuring appro-
priate fit for context and population. A final general insight is that
social determinants were not strong indicators of choice in this
context, implying that knowing a single behaviour or preference
may be more powerful than a number of demographic measures.
Collectively, these insights provide clarity to highly nuanced,
complex patterns across population behaviours in the context of
financial choice under uncertainty. Most importantly, they
highlight relevant implications for the design of policy interven-
tions that impact behaviours with direct consequences for the
well-being of individuals and populations.
Data availability
All data generated or analysed during this study are currently
available in the Figshare repository. The data from the pilot study
are available here https://figshare.com/s/40765bbca132bcf37100.
The data from the main study are available here https://figshare.
com/s/af0f77c648348b1f3742. The data from the replication study
are available here https://figshare.com/s/27aeccd5230fd082bdb6.
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Notes
1 Note that a suboptimal decision may not necessarily be a negative choice, but simply
not the one with the highest expected value.
2 https://osf.io/zhjca/?view_only= 7c98e41dff7248afbd5cffc4f7831c29.
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